Moral Hazard and Healthcare

Moral Hazard and Healthcare

Moral hazard emerged in 19th-century insurance underwriting, became a formal economic concept applied to healthcare in the 1960s, and has shaped the debate over patient cost-sharing. Accumulating evidence indicates that the moral hazard logic of traditional insurance no longer serves the best interests of the healthcare industry and the communities and individuals who depend on health insurance for access to care.

Beyond Moral Hazard

Healthcare is very tangled up in the moral hazard logic which assumes that patients "consume less healthcare when they are required to pay more for it out of pocket."

There are several serious flaws in this line of thinking:

  • For the patient, the deterrent to moral hazard is already sufficient: the fear associated with uncertainty, treatment costs, medical debt, pain, not to mention the risk of harm due to medical errors. These elements loom large in the minds and motivations of patients. People generally try to avoid utilizing healthcare. Going to the doctor is not as appealing as eating pizza or drinking beer.
  • There is more than one form of over-consumption. People who "over-consume" health services are not being "greedy", they are usually being under-served. They return to the doctor over and over, or seek out additional doctors because they are not getting the solutions they need and the system is failing them. Its not indulgence, its distress.
  • Finally, the problem of clarity: when people order burgers at a drive thru, they are willfully, consciously making a decision to consume something: they are presented with a clearly priced menu, the opportunity to select from the options, the opportunity to confirm their order and the price, then promptly receive what they ordered. In contrast, Healthcare rarely - safe to say never - offers this kind of experience. Bills accumulate via non-transparent processes and fee schedules, then are delivered via inscrutable paperwork. Patients must wait to see if a treatment is effective or not. If it's not effective, then they are forced to start another cycle of "consumption."

In this context, going on about moral hazard and "over-consumption" is failing to connect to the realities people are living through. Moral hazard - as frequently invoked in healthcare discussions - fails to accurately describe the economic behaviors of patients and doctors in healthcare.

The Failure of the Moral Hazard Construct in US Healthcare

The moral hazard argument as structured today tacitly accepts the twisted insensitive logic that healthcare cost and complexity are actually good(!) because they help control moral hazard and supposedly limit what the industry has come to call "over-consumption". The US healthcare industry needs to either abandon moral hazard thinking, or admit that the mission statements about healthcare equity and "healthcare for all" are just purpose-washing. Right now, the industry attempts to serve two conflicting mental models - working in literal opposition to itself. The enormous waste and churn in US healthcare is the result.

The logic of moral hazard has been a dominant influence on pricing and capital management strategies of health insurance for decades now. Yet during that same time, moral hazard and its implementations have completely failed to control costs - which are higher than ever.

Healthcare Finance leaders on both the payer and provider sides should acknowledge that this construct no longer serves us.

It is time for more diligent financial innovation toward simple affordable healthcare.

Moral Hazard: Different Takes

In 2005, Malcom Gladwell published this essay which provides a good history of how moral hazard found a home in the health policy logic in the US, but interestingly not in other western nations.

The moral hazard section starts about 1/3 way thru - highly recommended read for healthcare leaders.

Not everyone agrees with Gladwell's argument.

This counter argument by Liran Einav and Amy Finkelstein offers a different take, and a window into the curiously selective way moral hazard is applied to the players in US healthcare system.

Einav and Finkelstein acknowledge dissenting opinions, but try to establish that moral hazard does exist in health insurance:

"Just like almost any other good, individuals increase their healthcare utilization when the price they have to pay for it is lower."

But healthcare is not just "like any other good." The purchase and selection process is very different. Patients aren't selecting and making purchase decisions the same way they are when they are shopping for rice or apples.

In "normal" retail there are a range of options with clear differences and clear pricing. All of the options are functional and typically backed by a return policy. One brand of rice might be more expensive than another, but I can make dinner with either one. I might like one better than the other. If the rice has bugs in it, I can return it for a refund. Whatever the scenario, I can manage to get some rice and not go hungry.

This, as you know, is not how healthcare works.

  • Significant portions of healthcare purchases are not discretionary. They are forced by life threatening events, and fear of harm to self or a loved one. This is not the difference between "nice rice" and "cheap rice". This is the difference between getting what you need or not making it.
  • Patients rarely have a full understanding of the price at the time they are making their purchase decisions. Neither does anyone else for that matter.
  • A very small percentage of patients drive a very large percentage of the spending.
  • Patients are not really agents capable of controlling their spending. They have no view into how pricing is calculated, or how it aggregates. In other words, they are not really in a position to be incentivized by price manipulation. Pricing can stress them out, deprive them of needed treatment or cause harm, but it can not to any reasonable mind provide a safe or effective means of guiding behavior. This should be over the doorway of every conference room where health insurance products are designed.

Curiously, Einav and Finkelstein acknowledge these realities throughout their paper linked above, but never crystallize them into actionable conclusions. The concluding paragraphs dissolve into hazy statements clinging to one premise: demand responds to pricing, so if we just make patients pay more, then demand will subside.

Their argument rests on a traditional economic assumption that predates the rise of corporate pricing power (the ability of companies to raise prices without fear of losing market share) and the way pricing power is enabled by debt - in healthcare's case: medical debt. In the face of national crisis of healthcare affordability it's an incredibly obtuse position to take.

The important distinction: evidence that insurance increases healthcare utilization or that higher costs reduce it, does not, by itself, establish that the additional care is unnecessary.  That distinction is central to understanding the limitations of moral hazard as a healthcare policy framework. 

How many times have you heard, "We didn't go to the doctor because we had no idea what it would cost"? If you think you hear it a lot, the evidence supports your observation nearly a third of US adults report skipping care due to concerns about out of pocket costs. Vague unclear pricing causes people to avoid care. Delayed utilization forces more expensive forms of utilization later.

Plot twist: I am inclined to agree with the writers that moral hazard may exist in healthcare. But perhaps the vector for moral hazard is not the patient.

Where does Moral Hazard really occur?

Caveat: The language here may seem unfair and accusatory to the passionate and deeply caring individuals working across the different industry verticals in healthcare. To be clear, we're attempting to describe the economics in play, NOT the intentions and character of the individuals working inside the systems guided by those economics.

Piggy bank eating coins
Photo by Andre Taissin / Unsplash

Who are the "bad actors?"

As described in the paragraphs above, moral hazard in healthcare is framed as if patients were the "bad actors", and that charging them more, or complicating their care pathways is just a necessary evil for counteracting the behaviors of these "bad actors."

It seems like such an obtuse position, in the face of the national crisis of healthcare affordability.

But for the financial establishment of healthcare it could also be very convenient line of financial logic: it justifies raising prices and taking a greater and greater share of GDP, while blaming things on "consumers."

But what do we mean by the financial establishment of healthcare?

This is where it is important to be very clear about who or what we might actually accuse:

Do not think in terms of individuals, companies or even healthcare industry segments.

Think in terms of economic roles.

There is a specific role that exists across the different verticals of healthcare:

  • That role in some way is responsible to preserve and grow capital.
  • This role is not evil. It has a legitimate purpose.
  • This role holds profound influence over healthcare processes and outcomes.
  • This role is subject to moral hazard.

Look at any government healthcare program, any hospital system, insurer, just about any team or organization in healthcare, and you will find a person or team that is required to play this role.

The Role that is subject to Moral Hazard

Let's call this role the "Capital Manager", and let's define it:

A Capital Manager is an entity that has a responsibility to preserve and grow capital. The Capital Manager entity may directly own the capital, or may be managing capital entrusted to it by another entity. The Capital Manager entity could be an individual, an organization, or even a set of affiliated organizations who have a shared interest in preserving a set of capital.

What are examples of Capital Managers at work?

  • For-profit healthcare providers working to provide care while also provide return on investments to shareholders who support them.
  • Healthcare VCs try to generate largest possible revenues and ROI for new medical devices and treatments.
  • Health system finance teams trying to ensure healthy balance sheets.
  • Health insurers trying to maintain required reserves.

These entities have a large set of protective instruments at their disposal. A few examples (each of these are actually categories of protective instruments):

So where does the moral hazard arise?

If we state what moral hazard is in simple terms...

If I am given some kind of advantage, I may be tempted to take advantage of it in an inappropriate manner.

We can restate the moral hazard premise as follows:

Moral hazard in healthcare exists when capital protectors use the large set of protective instruments at their disposal to obtain one-sided benefits for themselves at the expense of individuals who need healthcare.

Summary: Conventional Wisdom vs Reality

The conventional healthcare industry thinking on moral hazard holds the following:

  • Moral hazard exists and it is a risk to the industry
  • Consumers are alleged to be the cause and source of this moral hazard
  • Onerous mechanisms like cost and complexity are appropriate and necessary for managing this moral hazard

It turns out that Capital Managers may actually be the source of moral hazard in healthcare. This raises the interesting question: what might be the "onerous mechanisms" appropriate and necessary for managing this moral hazard?

And is an onerous control mechanism actually what is needed?

Maybe what is needed is a change in mindset that reframes the risk/reward equation and aligns our shared interests in a more realistic and equitable way?

We need to lay a new policy foundation for this reframing so we can correct the distorted economics of US healthcare. This reframing would start with the question: What are the responsibilities of capital managers to their societies?

If we want to achieve this kind of foundational change in healthcare, then what is the most timely and effective approach for doing so?

At a minimum we need to start challenging the status quo thinking so we can drive affordability in more meaningful ways. We should also begin actively experimenting with ideas outside of the canon of traditional health insurance underwriting so we can take more meaningful steps toward enabling affordability. This kind of financial innovation may be able to reveal a new path forward for an industry where our math has changed, our values have changed, but our mental models are still rooted in 19th century economics.

See also:


A Short History of Moral Hazard: How an Idea from Fire Insurance Came to Shape US Healthcare

The concept of moral hazard originated in the insurance industry more than 150 years ago. Its evolution helps explain why modern health insurance relies so heavily on deductibles, copayments, and other mechanisms intended to discourage unnecessary spending.

1. The origins: Insurance, trust, and human behavior

The idea behind moral hazard predates the term itself. As insurance markets developed during the 17th and 18th centuries, insurers confronted a fundamental question: What happens to people's behavior when they are protected from the financial consequences of risk?

An insured property owner might take fewer precautions against fire, for example, because the insurance company would absorb much of the financial loss. Underwriters also worried about outright fraud.

The language evolved alongside early developments in probability theory, where mathematicians such as Daniel Bernoulli used the word moral to describe subjective valuations of uncertain outcomes, rather than ethical judgments. This was part of the intellectual background, although not necessarily the direct origin of the insurance term.

For a detailed historical treatment, see David Rowell and Luke Connelly's A History of the Term Moral Hazard (2012).

2. The 19th century: Moral hazard gets its name

The first recorded use of the specific term moral hazard appeared in 1865, in Arthur C. Ducat's The Practice of Fire Underwriting.

At the time, the term carried a distinctly moralistic meaning. Insurers worried about policyholders who might deliberately destroy insured property, neglect reasonable precautions, or otherwise exploit their coverage.

The concern was partly about character and partly about temptation created by the insurance contract itself.

This distinction matters. The insurance industry was beginning to recognize that financial arrangements could influence behavior, even among people who were not inherently dishonest.

Historian Robin Pearson examines this evolution in Moral Hazard and the Assessment of Insurance Risk in Eighteenth- and Early-Nineteenth-Century Britain.

3. The 1960s: Moral hazard enters healthcare economics

A major turning point came in 1963, when economist Kenneth Arrow published his landmark paper, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care.

Arrow explored why healthcare operates differently from ordinary markets. Illness is uncertain, patients possess less information than physicians, and the consequences of inadequate care can be severe. Insurance helps address these problems, but it can also change incentives.

In 1968, economist Mark Pauly developed the argument further in The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment.

The essential idea was that patients who pay only a small fraction of the cost of medical services may consume more healthcare than they would if they faced the full price.

Importantly, this did not require dishonesty, fraud, or bad character. It could arise from perfectly ordinary responses to prices.

Moral hazard had evolved from a judgment about individual morality into an economic theory about how insurance changes behavior.

This reasoning would become central to the justification for deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance.

4. The 1970s and 1980s: Putting the theory to the test

The influential RAND Health Insurance Experiment tested how different levels of patient cost-sharing affected healthcare use and outcomes.

The experiment confirmed that higher out-of-pocket costs generally reduced healthcare consumption. However, it produced another important finding: cost-sharing reduced the use of both highly effective and less effective medical services.

For most participants, researchers found no significant overall health differences. But free care improved certain outcomes, particularly among poorer and sicker participants, including blood pressure control and vision.

Read RAND's summary of the Health Insurance Experiment.

These findings established an important distinction. Reducing healthcare utilization is relatively straightforward. Reducing unnecessary healthcare utilization without discouraging beneficial care is considerably more difficult.

5. The modern debate: Is additional healthcare necessarily wasteful?

More recent economic research has challenged the assumption that increased healthcare spending caused by insurance necessarily represents an economic loss.

Economist John Nyman argues that insurance makes valuable treatments affordable to people who could not otherwise purchase them. Some additional healthcare consumption therefore represents an important benefit of insurance rather than waste.

See Nyman's Is "Moral Hazard" Inefficient? (2004).

Meanwhile, economists Liran Einav and Amy Finkelstein have demonstrated that moral hazard is empirically real: insurance coverage influences medical spending. But measuring this effect does not automatically tell us whether the resulting care is socially beneficial or excessive.

Their 2018 research review also highlights the importance of incentives facing healthcare providers, not simply patients.

What this history means for healthcare today

The history of moral hazard reveals an important tension in the design of health insurance.

Insurance was created to protect people against financial risks they could not reasonably bear alone. Yet the economics of moral hazard has encouraged insurers to return part of that financial risk to patients as a way of influencing consumption.

It's logical - an even empirically demonstrated in studies - that forcing insured members to pay more of the costs can bring a reduction spending in that current year. But what happens the following year?

Lingering questions about the efficiency or inefficiency of this spending have not really been acknowledged. Excessive cost-sharing can actually discourage necessary treatment, undermine financial protection, and worsen health outcomes. These worsening health outcomes (and their accumulating avoidable costs) is an area that needs more study: these avoidable medical costs are not calculated into the logical of whether cost sharing actually works in the long term, because individuals with worsening health outcomes are sometimes transferred from one insurer to another, such as when an insurer decides to pull out of a market. Or a member switches to another insurer. Or looses their ability to remain employed and moves to government based insurance.

The challenge is to distinguish between healthcare spending that produces little value and spending that restores health, prevents suffering, or enables productive participation in society.

Perhaps the most important question is no longer simply how to prevent people from consuming too much healthcare. It is how to design insurance systems that encourage the right care, protect people from financial harm, and enable better health outcomes.


  1. Rowell, David, and Luke B. Connelly (2012). A History of the Term "Moral Hazard." Journal of Risk and Insurance. An excellent historical examination of how the concept evolved from insurance underwriting into modern economics.
  2. Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963). Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care. American Economic Review.The foundational work explaining why healthcare markets differ from conventional competitive markets.
  3. Pauly, Mark V. (1968). The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment. American Economic Review. A seminal explanation of how health insurance changes consumer incentives.
  4. RAND Corporation (2006). The Health Insurance Experiment: A Classic RAND Study Speaks to the Current Health Care Reform Debate. Essential empirical evidence on the effects of cost-sharing.
  5. Nyman, John A. (2004). Is "Moral Hazard" Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New Theory. Health Affairs.An important challenge to the assumption that additional healthcare consumption is inherently wasteful.
  6. Einav, Liran, and Amy Finkelstein (2018). Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It. Journal of the European Economic Association. A rigorous modern review of the empirical evidence and implications for insurance design.